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I Introduction 
  
1.      In Seychelles the appointment of judges and other positions 
requiring independence falls under the responsibility of the President of 
the Republic and of the Constitutional Appointments Authority (CAA). This 
article will examine the relationship between the President and the CAA. 
  
2.      A common assumption in Seychelles is that the role of the CAA lies 
in recommending judges and other constitutional office holders to the 
President. Since this is a mere recommendation, the common assumption 
goes, the President has a discretion to refuse to appoint the people 
recommended by the CAA. This article will argue that this view is 
incorrect. In most cases the President does not have a discretion in 
appointing judges and other office holders. His role is there similar to that 
of Her Majesty The Queen in appointing judges in the UK. It is only in 
limited circumstances that the CAA's role is merely to recommend. In 
those cases the President is free to reject the CAA's recommendation. 
  
3.      Section II argues that the use of words such as “recommend” or 
“propose” does not say anything about whether the President has a 
discretion or not. Section III argues that in a number of instances, 
including judicial appointments, the President must give effect to the 
CAA's proposal. Section IV argues that in those cases the CAA is not 
required (but is free) to give the President a list of candidates to choose 
from. Section V considers instances where the President has a discretion. 
Section VI considers two somewhat ambiguous instances where it is 
argued that the President does not have a discretion. 
  
4.      Section VII argues that the division between discretionary and 
mandatory appointments is not arbitrary but actually serves a purpose: 
protecting independence. Section VIII argues that the only instances 
where they President may refuse to appoint (in mandatory instances) is if 
the CAA has acted ultra vires. Section IX argues that in mandatory 
instances the President is bound by the length of time given by the CAA 
but that in discretionary instances he is free. Section X concludes. 
  
II Irrelevance of the use of “recommend” 
  
5.      The fact that in the Constitution the word “recommend” is used does 
not in itself mean that the President has a discretion. This can be seen 
from the following Articles. 
  
6.      Removal of judges 
Article 134(3): “Where, under clause (2), the tribunal recommends that a 
Justice of Appeal or Judge ought to be removed from office, the President 
shall remove the Justice of Appeal or Judge from office.” 
  
7.      Removal of officers 
Article 165(4): “Where under clause (3), a tribunal recommends that an 
officer to whom this Article applies ought to be removed from office, the 
President shall remove the officer from office.” 
  
8.      Removal of commissioners 
Article 166(2): “A Commissioner shall be removed from office by the 
President where the question of the removal of the Commissioner from 
office has been referred to a tribunal appointed under clause (3) and the 
tribunal has recommended to the President that the Commissioner ought 
to be removed from office.” 
  
9.      In all those case although the tribunal “recommends” the President 
is under an obligation to give effect to the “recommendation” of the 
tribunal. This is because “shall” is used. 
  
10.  The word propose does suggest that the person the proposal is made 
to can reject it, although the permissibility of a rejection is less clear than 
if “recommend” is used. A fortiori, it follows that in the context of 
Constitutional appointments the fact that the word “propose” is used does 
not necessarily mean that the President has a discretion (since in the 
above case “recommend” was used but there is no discretion). 
  
III Mandatory instances 
  
11.  So in the following the use of “propose” does not necessarily mean 
the President has a discretion: 
  
12.  Justices of Appeal 
Article 123: “The President shall, by instrument under the Public Seal, 
appoint the President of the Court of Appeal and other Justices of Appeal 
from candidates proposed by the Constitutional Appointments Authority.” 
  
13.  Judges of the Supreme Court 
Article 127: “The President shall, by instrument under the Public Seal, 
appoint the Judges and Masters of the Supreme Court from candidates 
proposed by the Constitutional Appointments Authority.” 
  
14.  Other officers 
Article 62(3): “Appointment to an office declared by the President not to 
be an office in the public service shall be made by the President from 
candidates proposed by the Constitutional Appointments Authority.” 
  
15.  Attorney General 
Article 76(1): “There shall be an Attorney-General who shall be appointed 
by the President from candidates proposed by the Constitutional 
Appointments Authority.” 
  
16.  Electoral Commissioner (original Constitution) 
Article 115(1): “There shall be an Electoral Commissioner who shall be 
appointed by the President from candidates proposed by the Constitutional 
Appointments Authority for a term of office of not more than seven years.” 
  
17.  Ombudsmen 
Article 143(1): “There shall be an Ombudsman who shall be appointed by 
the President from candidates proposed by the Constitutional 
Appointments Authority.” 
  
18.  Auditor-General 
Article 158(1): “There shall be an Auditor-General who shall be appointed 
by the President from candidates proposed by the Constitutional 
Appointments Authority.” 
  
19.  Once again the word “propose” does not mean there is a discretion 
and the use of “shall appoint” and “shall be appointed” means it is not 
discretionary but mandatory. The President cannot refuse to appoint 
someone proposed by the CAA. 
  
IV Must the CAA give a list which the President can choose from? 
  
20.  All the above Articles state “candidates proposed”. Does this mean 
that the CAA is obliged to propose more than one candidate (for a single 
vacancy) and the President can choose which one to appoint? It is 
submitted that it does not. 
  
21.  Schedule 2 para 2 of the Constitution states: “In this Constitution, 
unless the context otherwise requires, words in the singular shall include 
the plural and words in the plural shall include the singular.” 
  
22.  Hence, the CAA is not required to give the President a list unless the 
context requires otherwise. In the case of Articles 123 (Justices of Appeal), 
127 (Judges of the Supreme Court) and 62(3) (other officers) the plural 
was used because those Articles concerned the appointment of many 
individuals. So the context does not require that the CAA proposes more 
than one person for the post of the judge. 
  
23.  Insofar as the other Articles are concerned the position is less clear. 
The plural was used as this was the only possibility with the syntax that 
was adopted (try constructing the same sentence but with the singular, 
you cannot). The question then is, was this particular syntax adopted 
because it was intended that the CAA proposes more than one candidate 
from the President to choose from? I do not know, but the effect of 
Schedule 2 para 2 is that the CAA is free to propose only one candidate 
unless the context requires otherwise. There is no evidence that it does. 
So the CAA is free to propose just a single candidate or give a list. 
  
24.  This is confirmed when one looks at the provision of the original 
Constitution regarding the appointment of the Chairman of the CAA and of 
the PSAB. 
  
25.  Chairman CAA (original constitution) 
Article 140(2): “Where the two members of the Constitutional 
Appointments Authority appointed under clause (1)(a) are unable to agree 
on the appointment of the third member and Chairman of the Authority, 
the two members shall, within fourteen days after the end of 
the period specified in clause (1) (b) , propose a list of not less than two 
and not more than three candidates for the office of member and 
Chairman of the Authority to the President and the President shall appoint 
one of the candidates proposed as member and Chairman of the 
Authority.” 
  
26.  Chairman PSAB (original constitution) 
Article 148(2): “Where the two members of the Public Service Appeal 
Board appointed under clause (1) (a) are unable to agree on the 
appointment of the third member and Chairman of the Board, the two 
members shall, within fourteen days after the end of the period specified 
in clause (1)(b), propose a list of not less than two and not more than 
three candidates for the office of member and Chairman of the Board to 
the President and the President shall appoint one of the candidates 
proposed as member and Chairman of the Board.” 
  
27.  These were later amended in 1996 but the emphasised section 
remains unchanged. 
  
28.  In the Constitution, when it was intended that a list be sent to the 
President for him to choose from this was made explicit. 
  
29.  This is further confirmed when one looks at the new provisions 
regarding the Electoral Commission. Article 115A(1) states: “The 
Commission shall consist of a Chairperson and four Members all of whom 
shall be appointed by the President selected from seven candidates of 
proven integrity and high repute, proposed by the Constitutional 
Appointment Authority constituted under Article 139 of the Constitution.” 
This provision explicitly gives the President the right to choose five from a 
list of seven. 
  
30.  There is nothing explicit in the provisions concerning the Attorney-
General, the Ombudsmen, the Auditor-General and (in the original 
Constitution) the Electoral Commissioner. 
  
31.  The Constitution must be read as a whole: Sch 2 para 8(b). The fact 
that in some cases the requirement of a list was made explicit but that in 
others nothing explicit was said must mean that in those later cases there 
is no obligation to give a list of names. 
  
32.  Therefore, the CAA is free but not obliged to give the President more 
candidates than there are vacancies and the President cannot refuse to 
appoint someone proposed by the CAA (even if the CAA proposes only one 
person). 
  
V Instances where the President has a discretion 
  
33.  In all the following the President clearly has a discretion to refuse to 
do what the CAA wants. 
  
34.  Advisory Committee 
Article 61: “There shall be an advisory committee on the power of pardon 
under Article 60 which shall consist of not less than three and not more 
than five persons as may be appointed for a term of seven years by the 
President from candidates proposed by the Constitutional Appointments 
Authority.” 
  
35.  Acting Justice of Appeal 
Article 124(2)(d): “the President may appoint a person from candidates 
proposed by the Constitutional Appointments Authority to act as Justice of 
Appeal until ...” 
  
36.  Acting Judge of SC 
Article 128(2)(d): “the President may appoint a person from candidates 
proposed by the Constitutional Appointments Authority to act as a Judge” 
  
37.  Renewal of term 
Article 131(4): “The President may, on the recommendation of the 
Constitutional Appointments Authority in exceptional circumstances, 
appoint a person who is not a citizen of Seychelles and who has already 
completed one term of office as a Justice of Appeal or 
Judge for a second term of office, whether consecutive or not, of not more 
than seven 
years.” 
  
38.  Removal of judges pending 
Article 134(4): “Where under this Article the question of removing a 
Justice of Appeal or Judge has been referred to a tribunal, the President 
may suspend the Justice of Appeal or Judge from performing the functions 
of a Justice of Appeal or Judge, but the suspension - 
a. may, on the advice of the Constitutional Appointments Authority, be 
revoked at any time by the President; 
b. shall cease to have effect if the tribunal recommends to the President 
that the Justice of Appeal or Judge ought not to be removed from office.” 
  
39.  In addition, as stated above, in cases concerning the Chairmen of the 
CAA and of the PSAB and the Electoral Commission the President has a 
limited discretion. He must appoint someone from the list he is given but 
he cannot refuse to appoint the requisite number of people. 
  
VI Some ambiguous provisions 
  
40.  The following two provisions are somewhat ambiguous as to whether 
the President has a discretion or not. 
  
41.  Acting President of the CA 
Article 124(1)(c): “the functions of the office of President of the Court of 
Appeal shall be performed by a justice of Appeal appointed for the purpose 
by the President from Justices of Appeal proposed by the Constitutional 
Appointments Authority.” 
  
42.  Acting CJ 
Article 128(1)(b): “until the person holding that office has resumed the 
functions of that office, as the case may be, the functions of the office 
shall be performed by a Judge appointed by the President from Judges 
proposed by the Constitutional Appointments Authority.” 
  
43.  The two above do not contain either “the President may” or “the 
President shall”. Furthermore they are found in two Articles which also 
contain a discretionary power of appointment (for acting Justices of Appeal 
and acting Judges respectively). Nevertheless it is submitted that they are 
mandatory. 
  
44.  Firstly, the “shall” of “shall be performed by” applies also to 
“appointed by the President”. 
  
45.  Secondly, the administration of Justice requires that there be a Chief 
Justice and a President of the Court of Appeal. This is unlike Acting 
Justices or Acting Judges, those are not essential. If these Articles were 
interpreted as discretionary then there could be a situation where the 
President keeps on refusing to appoint anyone and so Seychelles is left 
with no Chief Justice or President of the Court of Appeal. Therefore, those 
Articles are mandatory. 
  
VII How it all fits together 
  
46.  Why is it that some provisions are mandatory and others are 
discretionary? The purpose of the having an independent body, the CAA, 
involved in appointments is to ensure that political considerations do not 
influence the appointment to positions which require independence. 
  
47.  When independence is not required or the threat to independence is 
minimal the provisions are discretionary. Otherwise they are mandatory. I 
will show this by taking the discretionary provisions in turn. 
  
48.  Advisory committee 
As the name states this a committee to advice the President on the 
exercise of a power which is under his prerogative, the power of pardon. 
There is no need for the committee to be particularly independent. Hence 
a discretionary power. 
  
49.  Acting Justices and Judges 
These positions are temporary and not permanent. Furthermore the 
President must still appoint someone proposed by the CAA. This preserves 
independence. All the President can do is to refuse to make someone an 
Acting Justice or Judge. The threat to independence is minimal. 
  
50.  Renewal of term 
The person in question would have been appointed to his first term using a 
mandatory provision. That person is then independent. Further the CAA 
must still recommend the re-appointment of that person. The threat to 
independence is then in such cases minimal. 
  
51.  Removal of judges pending 
This deals to a case where a judicial officer is being investigated by an 
independent tribunal appointed by the CAA. The judicial officer has not yet 
been found guilty, but the President has suspended him during the 
investigation. The threat to independence created by the fact the President 
can ignore the CAA's advice to revoke the suspension is once again 
minimal. 
  
VIII When may the President refuse to appoint despite the exercise 
of a mandatory provision? 
  
52.  Only if the CAA acted ultra vires in its proposal. In such a case the 
President has the duty to refuse to appoint. This is because the CAA's 
proposal is then a nullity: Anisminic v Foreign Compensation 
Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. If in those circumstances the President 
were nevertheless to appoint the person proposed then he would be 
acting ultra vires and hence unconstitutionally. Hence he is under a duty 
not to appoint if the CAA actedultra vires. 
  
53.  There is of course nothing improper (or, at any rate, nothing unlawful 
or unconstitutional) with the President, on being told by the CAA who its 
candidate is, asking the CAA to reconsider the matter. However, the CAA 
is perfectly entitled to insist on its proposal. The President is then obliged 
to appoint. 
  
54.  If the President refuses to do so then it is open to the CAA, the person 
proposed or anyone else having locus standi to apply to the court for the 
writ of mandamus to force the President to appoint the person. 
  
IX Length of term 
  
55.  In the recent case of James Michel et al and Justice Domah v Viral 
DhanjeeSCA 5 and 6/2012 the majority of the Court of Appeal held that, in 
a case concerning reappointment under Article 131(4) (which as argued 
above is discretionary), the President could appoint for a longer term as 
the one recommended by the CAA. 
  
56.  Twomey J stated at [29]: “[I]t is the President and not the CAA who 
appoints and decides on the length of the term of appointment. The CAA's 
duties are to recommend in exceptional circumstances for reappointment 
the non-Seychellois judge. It is not their prerogative to dictate to the 
President how long the term should be.” 
  
57.  I believe this is correct. This, however, does not apply to instances 
where the President has no discretion to re-appoint. In those cases the 
President's role is, essentially, one of rubber stamping (though he is free 
to ask the CAA to reconsider). It is the CAA that really does the appointing 
and so the President is bound to give effect to the term proposed by the 
CAA (of course, once again, he is free to ask the CAA to reconsider). 
  
X Conclusion 
  
58.  In most instances, including in particular cases about appointment of 
judges, the President has no discretion to refuse to appoint a person 
proposed by the CAA, unless the CAA has acted ultra vires. In addition, 
the President has to appoint for the length of time suggested by the CAA. 
Furthermore, the CAA does not have to give him a list of people to choose 
from. 
  
59.  If the President refuses to appoint, then the courts can issue a writ of 
mandamus forcing him to do so. The President may, however, ask the CAA 
to reconsider but the CAA is entitled to insist on its initial proposal. 
  
60.  There are limited cases where the President has a discretion about 
whether to act on the CAA's proposals. These, however, all concern cases 
where independence is not required or the threat to independence is 
minimal. All other instances are mandatory or give limited discretion to the 
President. This is done to protect independence. 
  
61.  This conclusion is consistent with the fact that the CAA is named the 
Constitutional Appointments Authority and not the 
ConstitutionalRecommendation Authority. 
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